


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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

25X1

Top Secret

158

25X1

April 25, 1975

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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome.

25X1

CONTENTS
April 25, 1975

Romanian Ideological Counter-Offensive
Continues. 1

25X1

Yugoslav Roundtable Discussion:
A Shaky Start Toward Communist
and Leftist Party Cooperation 4

Soviet Leaders Discuss Production
Associations (GAMMA) 6

Belgrade Turns To Economic Tasks 7

Czechoslovakia: Rumors of
Dissidents Arrested. 8

25X1

Soviet Treatment of Trade with the US10

It's Detente and Whom You
Know That Counts12

25X1

Romania and Yugoslavia Develop
Fighter Aircraft15

25X1

Romanian Ideological Counter-Offensive Continues

Bucharest's ideological dispute with Moscow shows no sign of abating. It has now surfaced in a number of forums, including recent editions of the *World Marxist Review* and at Bucharest's celebrations of Lenin's 105th birthday.

The embassy reports that the Romanian-language version of the *Review* has been subjected to especially heavy censorship in recent months. For example, the Romanians deleted Soviet party secretary Ponomarev's recent article on the world role of socialism, probably because it blasted the Chinese leadership and called for "coordinated action by the fraternal states..." and an "active effort...against slander of the Soviet Union."

By contrast, Romanian-Soviet differences over whether a "socialist" state can also be a "developing" state are aired in a discussion wrapping up a *Review* series on "building developed socialism." The argument that a country can be both "socialist" and "developing" is part of Bucharest's effort to identify more closely with the nonaligned world. In taking this position, however, the Romanians also become vulnerable to charges of "bourgeois nationalism." Indeed, the Soviets, Bulgarians, and Hungarians have attacked the Romanian position as "theoretically unjustified" and similar to "capitalist" formulations. The Romanian participant in the discussion, however, stood his ground, saying he "had spoken clearly enough. Everyone can have his own opinion."

The Romanians marked Lenin's birthday, April 22, by quoting those writings of Lenin that support their policies and imply that Bucharest is more closely in

April 25, 1975

line with Lenin's teachings than is Moscow. The party daily's editorial cited Lenin's criticism that ideas valid in Marx's time cannot automatically be transferred to today's world. The paper added Ceausescu's recent statement that concrete solutions for present day problems will not be found in the thoughts of 100 or even 50 years ago.

The paper rebuts recent Soviet and bloc criticisms of nationalism, noting Lenin's special attention to the "natural need" for national identity. By citing Lenin's distinction between the nationalism of "oppressed nations" and that of "oppressors," the editorial took a slap at Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, and then drove home the point by quoting Lenin as saying that "nothing hampers class solidarity as much as national injustice."

Other articles commemorating Lenin's birth have taken even stronger jabs at Moscow. The party theoretical journal *Era Socialista* attacked "foreign literature" for perpetuating "distorted historical interpretations" that justify inequalities, past and present, including the dismemberment of national territory. These references are prompted by Romanian differences with Hungary and the Soviet Union over Transylvania and Bessarabia.

25X1

April 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

Yugoslav Roundtable Discussion: A Shaky Start
Toward Communist and Leftist Party Cooperation

Belgrade's ambitious attempt to bring together delegates from 40 European Communist and socialist parties predictably generated disagreements.

The roundtable discussion on economic cooperation between the developed and developing countries was held April 9-11 in Belgrade. Although all the Communist parties in the Soviet orbit sent participants, only 18 non-Communist delegations showed up. The governing West German and Swedish socialist parties were conspicuous by their absence. They evidently decided not to have any part of the polyglot assembly of differing ideologies. Belgrade, having made a special effort with the SPD, is probably disappointed over its failure to convince the SPD to send a delegation.

Embassy Belgrade reports that the Soviet, Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and East German participants took a less than cooperative stand on most proposals. For example, the orthodox parties rebuffed Yugoslav efforts to pass a proposal on increased aid to underdeveloped areas, claiming that they had no responsibility for a state of affairs brought on by the "collapse of capitalism." Moreover, these parties reportedly quibbled endlessly over Yugoslav proposals to write a final press release.

Belgrade sponsored the roundtable in an attempt to show that the time was ripe for the "progressive" parties of Europe to get together--despite their differences--on issues of mutual concern. The Yugoslavs have been among the most active proponents of broadening international Communist cooperation--and thereby diluting the influence of the Soviet

April 25, 1975

25X1

party. In the end, the only parties that supported Belgrade in its run-ins with the loyalist East European delegations were their old friends, the independent Italian and Romanian delegations.

25X1

April 25, 1975

-5-

25X1

[REDACTED]

Soviet Leaders Discuss Production Associations

Soviet authorities appear to be giving another push to the drawn-out process of reorganizing industry by creating production associations. In his Lenin day speech on April 22, Suslov strongly endorsed amalgamation of enterprises into financially autonomous associations, which he said now number over 1,500. Last year's speech by Politburo candidate member Ponomarev, who like Suslov has no responsibility for economic matters, contained nothing on the subject.

[REDACTED] the Presidium of the Council of Ministers was to discuss production associations on March 28. The 1973 decree authorizing the reorganization indicated that it was to be completed this year. The process has fallen hopelessly behind schedule because of bureaucratic inertia and opposition, and supporters of the reorganization may have urged that the leadership press for action.

25X1

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25X1

April 25, 1975

25X1

Belgrade Turns To Economic Tasks

The party presidium on Tuesday ordered a series of measures that it hopes will ensure adherence to federal economic policies and accelerate the drafting of the new Five Year Plan.

Speakers at the session indirectly warned managers to cease evading the belt-tightening measures ordered for 1975 and threatened retribution for "economic crimes." Details of the debate indicate that the party is thinking of giving more power to the state economic administration--which was described as ill-prepared to force Yugoslavia's decentralized economy to swallow its medicine. Moreover, Edvard Kardelj, a senior member of the presidium, called for legislation to give the judicial and police organs more power in the economic sphere. He said that their job had been hindered by interference from special interests.

The principal sins under attack may well be uncontrolled investment and unjustifiable price increases. A US embassy assessment concludes that the regime will soon be giving special attention to controlling investment and prices.

Kardelj stressed the need to begin immediate preparation of the next Five Year Plan (1976-1980), even though a new law on the planning system will not be ready until the end of the year. Kardelj did not say so, but the Yugoslavs are probably anxious to have at least a rough idea of their primary goals before signing five-year trade agreements with the CEMA countries later this year. Kardelj tried--unconvincingly--to explain away the contradictions inherent in drafting a Five Year Plan that will effectively regulate Yugoslavia's free-wheeling economic system.

25X1

April 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

Rumors of Dissidents Arrested

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Four dissident supporters of Alexander Dubcek were arrested Wednesday night [redacted]

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[redacted] News of the arrests is reportedly sweeping the Czechoslovak dissident community.

Two of those allegedly arrested--Zdenek Mlynar and Karel Bartosek--are prime candidates for punitive action by the regime. Mlynar co-authored Dubcek's 1968 Action Program and reportedly helped to draft the "Dubcek letter" last October. He was warned by name in the recent attacks on dissidence by party chief Husak and other Czechoslovak leaders. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Mlynar was one of those primarily responsible for a long document calling for reforms that is reportedly circulating illegally within Czechoslovakia.

25X1

Bartosek came under sharp attack in the party theoretical organ *Tribuna* on April 16. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] one of the other two arrested served as Dubcek's personal secretary during the Prague Spring.

Rumors of the arrests will probably cause severe anxiety among Czechoslovakia's intellectuals. There is already growing apprehension that a new round of repression might follow party chief Husak's bitter assault on "Dubcek and his ilk" last week.

25X1

It cannot be ruled out that the regime deliberately floated the rumors of the arrests. Any indication that the police are closing in on his associates could move Dubcek to take advantage of Husak's suggestion that he leave the country. [redacted]

25X1

April 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

Romanian-Soviet Differences
Loom Ahead at UN

Soviet-Romanian differences may spill over into the United Nations later this year when Bucharest seeks the East European seat on the Security Council for 1976-77. The seat is now occupied by the Belorussian SSR, and a successor will be selected in an East European caucus.

25X1

The Soviet UN Mission is following closely the changing balance of forces in the UN, particularly the increased role and influence of the nonaligned states.

25X1

25X1

April 25, 1975

25X1

Soviet Treatment of Trade with the US

Soviet officials continue to play upon two rather different themes in their comments on economic relations with the US. Some, especially in public or diplomatic forums, portray the USSR as perfectly able to shop elsewhere if difficulties over most-favored-nation status and trade credits are not resolved. Other officials freely express their preference for doing business with the US.

At the recent sessions of the US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission, Soviet representatives adopted the line that if commercial problems with the US continue, the USSR will simply find other trading partners. Writing in *Pravda* on April 9, Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev contrasted the progress in developing economic relations with West European countries with the "step backwards" that US trade legislation meant for US-Soviet relations. In his Lenin-day speech on April 22, Politburo member Suslov ignored the US in listing Western countries with which the Soviet Union is developing good trade relations.

Both Patolichev and *Pravda's* editorial on the recent party Central Committee plenum, however, state that the Soviets expect the US to repeal the offending legislation. Talk about alternative trade partners is probably considered a useful tactic to put pressure on Congress.

A more open acknowledgment of the importance of economic cooperation with the US was made by two Soviet officials in separate conversations with US embassy officers. According to a Gosplan official, his organization considers that the policy of pursuing highly developed economic relations with the US cannot be changed. He said the US is viewed as the only country capable of providing the range of economic advantages required for Soviet industrial modernization,

April 25, 1975

25X1

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including sophisticated equipment, technological processes, and managerial know-how and techniques.

On April 18, the Soviet minister of the gas industry told Ambassador Stoessel that he had been very impressed by his visit to the US in March and that his ministry was prepared to place an order for compressor stations in the US. He said that where a US supplier was competing with a non-US supplier, he would choose the US company every time.

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25X1

25X1

April 25, 1975

-11-

25X1

It's Detente and Whom You Know That Counts

Soviet author Vasily Aksenov told Ambassador Stoessel on April 22 that his effort to obtain permission to go to UCLA as a guest professor for the spring term has finally been successful. Aksenov said his travel papers are being processed and that he plans to leave soon.

Aksenov's lengthy struggle to visit the US illustrates the difficulties faced by nonconformist but still officially accepted cultural figures who request foreign travel. The biggest hurdle usually is the wary attitude of the conservative leaders of the writers' and other creative unions for whom travel abroad is a jealously guarded source of control and patronage. Aksenov's success, however, also illustrates that persistence, personal contacts, and knowledge of the sensitivities of different elements of the bureaucracy can pay off.

Thanking the ambassador for his personal and the embassy's continued interest in the case, Aksenov said that their help along with his own representations to the Central Committee finally resulted in a favorable decision. Aksenov believes that his case was pushed up "quite high" in the Central Committee and that the decision was ultimately made at the level of the "group around Aleksandrov." A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov is one of Brezhnev's personal aides, and his principal foreign policy adviser. Aksenov believes that the director of the USA Institute, Georgy Arbatov, also played a role in the decision.

Like many other Soviet cultural figures, Aksenov seems well aware of the relationship--and frequent conflict--between domestic and foreign policy considerations in an era of detente. He also evidently knows

April 25, 1975

-12-

25X1

25X1

how, with luck, to sway the balance in his favor. Another prominent Soviet artist, who has good connections in the upper levels of the party, recently said that the parts of the Central Committee apparatus responsible for foreign cultural relations are much more "reasonable" than the cultural unions and those elements of the party whose task of safeguarding domestic controls leaves them insensitive to foreign policy considerations.

From his own experience, Aksanov probably knows that solicitude at top party levels for the Soviet image abroad does not automatically guarantee a favorable outcome of cases like his; knowing whom, where, and how much to press is more important. Nevertheless, the relationship between the functional roles of the outward- and inward-oriented elements of the bureaucracy probably goes further to explain the fluctuations in foreign cultural policy than does the relative weight of "liberals" and "conservatives" within the leadership.

25X1

April 25, 1975

-13-

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

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Romania and Yugoslavia Develop Fighter Aircraft

Romania and Yugoslavia have publicly announced the joint development and production of the prototype of a new combat aircraft. This aircraft, known as the JUROM, reportedly made a demonstration flight on April 15 near Belgrade.

25X1

April 25, 1975

-15-

25X1

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The JUROM, which has never been viewed by Western observers, reportedly is a swept-wing, subsonic, jet aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce Viper engines. It has been under development for about three years and will probably be produced in both trainer and ground-attack versions. The program originally called for the production of about 200 aircraft for each country. Recent information indicates, however, that each country will receive an initial 100 aircraft with an option for 100 more if the plane's performance and cost prove satisfactory.

Tito's regime has a long-range goal of ending dependence on foreign arms suppliers by the end of the century. Domestic production of a jet fighter is one important step in this direction. The Yugoslavs apparently decided to build their own jet aircraft in the late 1950s after a rebuff first from the Soviets when they requested a license to build an advanced MIG fighter and later from the French when they sought a license to produce the Mirage. Proceeding on their own, they designed and produced a jet trainer and a light ground-attack aircraft and have also produced Western civil aircraft and helicopters under license.

Encouraged by this success, the Yugoslavs apparently broached to the Romanians in 1970 the idea of co-financing the research, development, and production of a new jet fighter. Initially, there was some disagreement about the mission of the new aircraft and about whether it was better to buy subsystems abroad or to attempt to produce all components themselves. These problems were eventually resolved and the Romanians agreed to participate in the program.

Romanian interest in the program is multifaceted. Bucharest has been slowly developing its aircraft industry since the mid-1960s. By 1970, the Romanian aircraft industry was producing Western civil aircraft

April 25, 1975

25X1

and helicopters under license. The Romanians need new military equipment--especially aircraft--and spare parts for existing equipment, but want to reduce their dependence on the Soviets for arms. They have sought, therefore, to diversify their sources of arms by the JUROM program as well as by securing limited amounts of Western military equipment.

The JUROM project probably was launched sometime in 1972 at Mostar in southwest Yugoslavia and at Bacau. The project called for the design and production of only the airframe. The engines, electronics, and other sub-components were to be imported from Britain, France, and Sweden. Each country may have constructed its own prototype designed to meet its specific requirements. Despite some developmental problems that delayed the initial flight of the prototypes, the program appears to have progressed fairly rapidly. The first flight of the Yugoslav prototype probably took place in mid-1974, with the Romanian test following later in the year.

Both production partners have expressed dissatisfaction with the engines obtained from Britain. The Romanians have concluded that these engines, which can develop only about a 4,000 pound thrust, are dated technologically and not very efficient. The Romanians probably had envisioned the JUROM as a replacement for their aging MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters. Equipped with the British engines, however, the JUROM's performance may not be significantly better than the older aircraft. The addition of after-burners could improve the thrust of the Viper engines, but neither country is believed to have the technology necessary for such a modification. The two countries have expressed some interest in acquiring larger engines, but, thus far, have been stymied by Western trade restrictions that prohibit the export to Warsaw Pact countries of jet aircraft engines capable of developing more than 5,000 pounds thrust.

April 25, 1975

25X1

25X1

Despite the problems encountered, the joint development of a jet fighter-type aircraft by the two countries is a notable accomplishment. Although still dependent on Western technology and components, the success of this venture points to a degree of independence for the Romanians and Yugoslavs in their future weapons procurement programs.

25X1

25X1

April 25, 1975

-18-

25X1

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